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1 Introduction 
 
Is coherence necessary for (epistemic) justification, in that one’s beliefs are justified only if 
one’s belief system is coherent? Is coherence sufficient for justification, in that one’s beliefs 
are justified if one’s belief system is coherent?1 Is coherence truth-conducive, in that 
coherence implies a high probability of truth, or in that coherence implies a higher probability 
of truth, or in that, ceteris paribus, greater coherence implies a greater probability of truth? 
These questions are important, difficult, and have been widely discussed.2 It would be helpful 
in answering such questions, it seems, if we had an account of coherence. It would be 
especially helpful if we had a quantitative account of coherence. I develop an account of that 
                                                
1 There are similar questions about justified (or rational) belief-revision. 
2 The third question (i.e., the question of whether coherence is truth-conducive), in 
particular, has been widely discussed of recent. See Angere (2007, 2008), Bovens and 
Hartmann (2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006), Bovens and Olsson (2000, 2002), Cross (1999), 
Huemer (1997, 2007, 2011), Klein and Warfield (1994, 1996), Meijs and Douven (2007), 
Merricks (1995), Olsson (2001, 2002, 2005a, 2005b), Olsson and Shogenji (2004), Roche 
(2010, 2012), Schubert and Olsson (2012), Schupbach (2008), Shogenji (1999, 2005, 2007, 
forthcoming), van Cleve (2005, 2011), and Wheeler (2009, 2012). 
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sort (a quantitative account) where coherence is defined (in large part) in terms of 
probability—a quantitative probabilistic account of coherence.3 
I do not aim to show that the account developed, hereafter “(CR),” is correct (or 
adequate), or even that it is preferable to all extant alternative accounts of coherence. I aim, 
rather, to show that at least in certain respects (CR) is preferable to (at least some of) the main 
extant probabilistic accounts of coherence: (i) Igor Douven and Wouter Meijs’s account 
(2007), hereafter “(CDM),”4 (ii) Branden Fitelson’s account (2003, 2004), hereafter “(CF),”5 
(iii) Erik Olsson’s account (2002, 2005a), hereafter “(CO),”6 and (iv) Tomoji Shogenji’s 
account (1999, 2001), hereafter “(CS).” I leave it for further investigation whether (CR) is 
preferable all things considered to (CDM), (CF), (CO), and (CS), whether (CR) is preferable 
all things considered to all alternative probabilistic accounts of coherence (extant or not) in 
addition to (CDM), (CF), (CO), and (CS),7 and whether (CR) is preferable all things 
considered to all nonprobabilistic accounts of coherence.8 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I set out some desiderata for an adequate 
account of coherence, and clarify the notion of a “probabilistic” account of coherence. In 
section 3, I explain, in the following order, (CS), (CO), (CDM), (CF), and (CR). Then, in 
section 4, I test the accounts against some cases. I contend that (CR), but not (CS), (CO), 
(CDM), or (CF), tests well against each case. Next, in section 5, I relate (CR) to an important, 
but little discussed, problem for standard varieties of coherentism, viz., the “Problem of 
Justified Inconsistent Beliefs.” Last, in section 6, I conclude. 
 
 
2 Preliminaries 
 
2.1 Some desiderata for an adequate account of coherence 
 
I take there to be at least three desiderata for an adequate account of coherence. First, an 
adequate account of coherence should imply that (a) coherence and incoherence come in 
degrees, (b) logical consistency is insufficient for coherence, (c) the degree to which a set of 
claims is coherent or incoherent is independent of the ordering of the claims in the set, and (d) 
no particular size (greater than 1) is needed for a (finite) set of claims to have a degree of 
                                                
3 The account is not meant to accurately describe how in fact ordinary people make 
coherence evaluations. Clarification as to what the account is meant to do is given below in 
2.1. 
4 Douven and Meijs develop three distinct accounts (2007, sec. 3), and argue that one of 
them is weakly preferable to the other two (2007, sec. 4). The account I call “(CDM)” is the 
account Douven and Meijs argue to be weakly preferable to the other two accounts. 
5 I have in mind the corrected version. The initial version is given in Fitelson (2003). Two 
corrections to that version are given in Fitelson (2004). 
6 Olsson holds, at least, that (CO) has some initial appeal. 
7 See, for example, Bovens and Hartmann (2003a, Ch. 2). 
8 See, for instance, Eliasmith and Thagard (1997), Thagard (1989a, 1989b, 1992, 2000, 
2004, 2012), Thagard and Nowak (1988), and Thagard and Verbeurgt (1998). And see Siebel 
(2005, 356-358; 2011), where it is argued that there can be no adequate probabilistic account 
of coherence. 
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coherence or incoherence.9 Suppose S1 = {p, q, r}, S2 = {q, r, s}, S3 = {q, p, r}, and S4 = {p, q, 
r, ~p}, where: 
 
p = No ravens are black; 
 
q = This bird is a raven; 
 
r = This bird is black; 
 
s = Some but very few ravens are black.10 
 
S1 is more incoherent (or has a higher degree of incoherence) than S2; this illustrates (a). S2 is 
logically consistent but not coherent (q, r, and s do not “hang together” in the requisite sense); 
this illustrates (b). S1 and S3 differ in the ordering of “p,” “q,” and “r,” and yet S1 and S3 have 
the same degree of incoherence; this illustrates (c). S2 and S4 differ in size, and yet each set has 
a degree of incoherence (S4’s being greater than S2’s); this illustrates (d). 
One terminological note is in order. I use the expression “coherence value” so that any 
degree of coherence is a coherence value, any degree of incoherence is a coherence value, and 
the neutral point between incoherence and coherence (if there is such a point) is a coherence 
value. 
Second, an adequate account of coherence should be intuitive or plausible (or at least 
should not be highly counterintuitive or implausible) in what it implies or does not imply with 
respect to particular cases (artificial or otherwise). Suppose some account implies that S4 is 
maximally coherent. This implication is not intuitive, in fact, is highly counterintuitive, and so 
counts (strongly if not decisively) against the account. Or suppose some account is silent on S4 
in that it has no implication with respect to S4’s coherence value (or even with respect to 
whether S4 has a coherence value). The account thus fails to imply what seems obvious, viz., 
that S4’s coherence value is very (perhaps maximally) low, that S4’s coherence value is less 
than S2’s coherence value, and so on. This counts against the account. 
Third, an adequate account of coherence should be explanatory. Suppose some account 
implies that S4 is incoherent, but only because the account has a proviso to the effect that S4 is 
incoherent. This counts (though perhaps only weakly) against the account. The account should 
explain why, and not merely imply that, S4 is incoherent.11 
                                                
9 Here and throughout the paper I assume that only finite sets of two or more claims can 
have a degree of coherence or incoherence. Cf. Akiba (2000). 
10 This case is adapted from BonJour (1985, 95-96). 
11 Also important, I believe, is the extent to which an account of coherence is fruitful in 
that it leads to results concerning, say, the reliability of witnesses in a witness scenario, the 
transmission of confirmation, and so on. For relevant discussion, see Dietrich and Moretti 
(2005) and Schubert (2012). I do not have the space to evaluate (CDM), (CF), (CO), (CR), 
and (CS) in terms of fruitfulness. Fitelson (2003, 194) gives a desideratum (referred to as 
“(1)”) on which, inter alia, an adequate account of coherence should imply that a set S = {p1, . 
. . , pn} is maximally coherent if p1, . . . , pn are logically equivalent (and S is satisfiable). I 
would be happy to accept this part of the desideratum; (CR), like (CF), implies that a set S = 
{p1, . . . , pn} is maximally coherent if p1, . . . , pn are logically equivalent (and S is satisfiable). 
But I would not be happy to accept the desideratum as a whole. See 4.2.1 below. 
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(CDM), (CF), (CO), (CR), and (CS) all imply (a)-(d) and so all satisfy the first 
desideratum.12 But not all of those accounts satisfy the second and third desiderata. Or so I 
argue in section 4. 
 
2.2 Probabilistic accounts of coherence 
 
Let’s say that a “probabilistic” account of coherence is an account on which coherence is 
defined (at least in large part) in terms of probability.13 Here is an example. Let S = {p1, . . . , 
pn}. Then, on the “joint probability” account, “(CJ),” the degree to which S is coherent, 
“CJ(S),” is given by: 
 
CJ(S) = Pr(𝑝! ∧ … ∧ 𝑝!). 
 
(CJ) is implausible.14 But, still, (CJ) serves as an example of a probabilistic account of 
coherence. 
Two additional preliminary points are in order. First, on probabilistic accounts of 
coherence a set of claims can have different coherence values on different probability 
distributions, indeed, can be coherent on some probability distributions and incoherent on 
others.15 It will help to consider an example. Suppose we have a deck of cards and randomly 
draw a card from the deck. Let S = {p1, p2}, where: 
 
p1 = The card selected is a heart; 
 
p2 = The card selected is red. 
 
Suppose the deck of cards is standard, so that: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 It is not trivial that (CDM), (CF), (CO), (CR), and (CS) all imply (a). Not all 
probabilistic accounts of coherence imply (a). Some probabilistic accounts of coherence are 
purely qualitative. See Douven and Meijs (2007, sec. 2), where five such accounts are 
developed and compared. See, also, Lewis (1946, 338); there the term “congruence” is used in 
place of the term “coherence.” 
13 By this standard, which admittedly is somewhat vague, each of (CDM), (CF), (CO), 
(CR), and (CS) is a probabilistic account of coherence. A more stringent standard could be 
employed. Perhaps then not all of (CDM), (CF), (CO), (CR), and (CS) would be probabilistic 
accounts of coherence. But, of course, nothing of importance hinges on how the various 
accounts are categorized. 
14 (CJ) does not do well with some of the cases discussed below in section 4, for example, 
Tweety and Tweety* (4.3). See Olsson’s discussion of “C0” (2005a, 98-99). 
15 See Douven and Meijs (2007, 407). 
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p1 p2 Pr 
T T .25 
T F 0 
F T .25 
F F .5 
 
On this probability distribution, CJ(S) = Pr(p1 ∧ p2) = .25. Suppose instead the deck of cards is 
nonstandard in that each of the 26 red cards is a heart, so that: 
 
p1 p2 Pr 
T T .5 
T F 0 
F T 0 
F F .5 
 
On this probability distribution, CJ(S) = Pr(p1 ∧ p2) = .5. (CJ) thus implies that S’s coherence 
value is greater on the second probability distribution than on the first. 
Second, a probabilistic account of coherence per se is neutral on the determinants (other 
than the axioms of the probability calculus) of the probabilistic facts in a given case. Here 
Shogenji (speaking in terms of beliefs and not in terms of claims) gives a disclaimer to the 
effect that his project is to give a characterization of coherence but not to identify what 
relations are responsible for coherence: 
 
This paper does not discuss what makes beliefs (more) coherent; it characterizes 
coherence of beliefs without attempting to decide what relations—logical, explanatory, 
etc.—are responsible for it. Once we separate the characterization of coherence from what 
is responsible for it, our task is fairly straightforward, but its precise formulation is still 
helpful in understanding its bearing on truth. (1999, 338, emphasis Shogenji’s) 
 
So one can accept a probabilistic account of coherence, and yet allow that the coherence facts 
in a given case, though directly determined by the probabilistic facts in the case, are indirectly 
determined by, say, the explanatory facts in the case—by allowing that at least certain of the 
probabilistic facts in a given case are determined by (in part) the explanatory facts in the 
case.16 
                                                
16 By “explanatory facts” I mean to include facts about the explanatory virtues, for 
example, simplicity. How can at least certain of the probabilistic facts in a given case be 
determined by (in part) the explanatory facts in the case? Imagine a case where h1 and h2 are 
scientific hypotheses, and h1 is preferable to h2 in terms of simplicity. One might hold that 
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3 The accounts explained 
 
In 3.1, I set out (CS). In 3.2, I set out (CO). In 3.3, I set out (CDM), (CF), and (CR). 
 
3.1 (CS) 
 
Let S = {p1, . . . , pn}. Then, on (CS) the degree to which S is coherent, “CS(S),” is given by: 
 
CS(S) = 
!"(!!  ∧  …  ∧  !!)!" !!   ×  …  ×  !"(!!).17 
 
If CS(S) < 1, S is incoherent. If CS(S) = 1, S is neither coherent nor incoherent. If CS(S) > 1, S 
is coherent. The minimum value for CS(S) is 0. There is no maximum value for CS(S). If some 
of the claims in S have a probability of 0, CS(S) is undefined. 
Consider a two-member set: S = {p1, p2}. By (CS) the degree to which S is coherent is 
given by: 
 
CS(S) = 
!"(!!  ∧  !!)!" !!   ×!" !!  = !" !!   ×!" !!     !!)!" !!   ×!" !!  = !" !!     !!)!" !! . 
 
If Pr(p2 | p1) = Pr(p2), CS(S) = 1. If Pr(p2 | p1) > Pr(p2), CS(S) > 1. If Pr(p2 | p1) < Pr(p2), CS(S) < 
1. So, whether S is coherent hinges on whether p1 is positively probabilistically relevant to p2. 
Note that positive (negative) probabilistic relevance is symmetrical. Thus, p1 is positively 
(negatively) probabilistically relevant to p2 just in case p2 is positively (negatively) 
probabilistically relevant to p1. So (CS) implies that whether a two-member set is coherent 
hinges on whether the claims in question are positively probabilistically relevant to each other. 
(CS) is a generalization of the thesis that whether a two-member set of claims is coherent 
hinges on whether the claims are positively probabilistically relevant to each other. This thesis 
has some initial plausibility. Thus so too does (CS).18 
                                                                                                                           
Pr(h1) > Pr(h2), and that this is owing in part to the fact that h1 is preferable to h2 in terms of 
simplicity. Or suppose (adapting a case from Okasha 2000, 702-703) Smith is in some 
distress, where e describes Smith’s symptoms. Suppose h1 is the claim “Smith has pulled a 
muscle,” and h2 is the claim “Smith has torn a ligament.” Suppose, given background 
information, e is better explained by h1 than by h2 in that e would be expected if h1 were true 
but not if h2 were true. Then, the idea goes, Pr(e | h1) > Pr(e | h2). The issues here, however, 
are many and difficult, and the relevant literature is vast. See, for starters, Day and Kincaid 
(1994), Douven (1999, 2011, sec. 4), Harman (1970), Huemer (2009a, 2009b), Iranzo (2008), 
Lipton (2001, 2004, Ch. 7), Lombrozo (2007), McGrew (2003), Niiniluoto (1999, 2004), 
Okasha (2000), Psillos (2004, 2007), Salmon (1970, 1990, 2001a, 2001b), Sober (2002), 
Swinburne (1973, Ch. VII), Tregear (2004), van Fraassen (1989, Ch. 7, sec. 4), and Weisberg 
(2009). 
17 Shogenji spells out his account of coherence in terms of sets of beliefs, not in terms of 
sets of claims. But nothing of importance, for my purposes, hinges on this difference. 
18 There are alternative generalizations of the thesis that whether a two-member set of 
claims is coherent hinges on whether the claims are positively probabilistically relevant to 
each other. One is developed by Jonah Schupbach (2011). I do not have the space to examine 
this account (or any of the other alternative generalizations). But what I say in 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 
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3.2 (CO) 
 
Let S = {p1, . . . , pn}. Then, on (CO) the degree to which S is coherent, “CO(S),” is given by: 
 
CO(S) = 
!" !!  ∧  …  ∧  !!!" !!  ∨  …  ∨  !! . 
 
CO(S) can take values between 0 and 1 (inclusive). If CO(S) = 0, S is maximally incoherent. If 
CO(S) = 1, S is maximally coherent. It is unspecified where the neutral point is between 
incoherence and coherence (or even whether there is a neutral point). If Pr(𝑝!   ∨   …   ∨   𝑝!) = 
0, CO(S) is undefined. 
Consider a two-member set: S = {p1, p2}. By (CO) the degree to which S is coherent is 
given by: 
 
CO(S) = 
!" !!  ∧  !!!" !!  ∨  !! . 
 
CO(S) measures how much of the total probability mass assigned to p1 and p2 falls in their 
overlap (or intersection). If p1 and p2 are equivalent to each other so that all of the total 
probability mass assigned to p1 and p2 falls in their overlap, then Pr(p1 ∧ p2) = Pr(p1 ∨ p2) and 
CO(S) = 1. If, to take the other extreme, p1 and p2 are incompatible with each other so that 
none of the total probability mass assigned to p1 and p2 falls in their overlap, then Pr(p1 ∧ p2) = 
0 and CO(S) = 0 (assuming Pr(p1 ∨ p2) > 0). 
(CO) has some initial plausibility. (CO) is a generalization of the thesis that the degree to 
which a two-member set of claims is coherent is determined by how much of the total 
probability mass assigned to the claims falls in their overlap, and this thesis has some initial 
plausibility.19 
 
3.3 (CDM), (CF), and (CR) 
 
(CDM), (CF), and (CR) are all instances of a certain schema (adapted from Douven and Meijs 
2007 and Fitelson 2004). So, before setting out the various accounts I want to set out the 
schema. 
Let S = {p1, . . . , pn}. Let S* = {S’ | S’ is a non-empty subset of S}.20 Let S** = {(S’, S’’) | 
S’ and S’’ are non-overlapping members of S*}. Let S*** = {(⋀S’, ⋀S’’) | (S’, S’’) is a 
member of S**}.21 Let m be a measure of confirmation (or evidential support). Let S**** = 
                                                                                                                           
4.1.3 about (CS) can also be said mutatis mutandis about the account developed by 
Schupbach. 
19 Meijs (2006) develops an alternative generalization. And there are yet additional 
alternative generalizations. I do not, alas, have the space to examine them. What I say in 4.1.2 
about (CO), though, can also be said mutatis mutandis about the account developed by Meijs. 
20 It might be better to define S so that it is an ordered set, and to define S* so that S’ is a 
nonempty subsequence of S. See Schubert (2012, 311-312). 
21 If S’ has just one member, then ⋀S’ is simply that member. Likewise with respect to 
S’’. 
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{m(⋀S’, ⋀S’’) | (⋀S’, ⋀S’’) is a member of S***}. Then, by account “(CX)” the degree to 
which S is coherent, “CX(S),” is given by: 
 
CX(S) = mean(S****). 
 
Different measures of confirmation can thus be used to generate different probabilistic 
accounts of coherence.22 
It will help to consider a few examples. First, suppose S = {p1, p2}. Then: 
 
S* = {{p1}, {p2}, {p1, p2}}; 
 
S** = {({p1}, {p2}), ({p2}, {p1})}; 
 
S*** = {(p1, p2), (p2, p1)}; 
 
S**** = {m(p1, p2), m(p2, p1)}; 
 
CX(S) = mean(S****) = 
! !!,  !!   !  ! !!,  !!! . 
 
Next, suppose S = {p1, p2, p3}. Then: 
 
S* = {{p1}, {p2}, {p3}, {p1, p2}, {p1, p3}, {p2, p3}, {p1, p2, p3}}; 
 
S** = {({p1}, {p2}), ({p1}, {p3}), ({p2}, {p1}), ({p2}, {p3}), ({p3}, {p1}), 
({p3}, {p2}), ({p1}, {p2, p3}), ({p2}, {p1, p3}), ({p3}, {p1, p2}), ({p1, p2}, 
{p3}), ({p1, p3}, {p2}), ({p2, p3}, {p1})}; 
 
S*** = {(p1, p2), (p1, p3), (p2, p1), (p2, p3), (p3, p1), (p3, p2), (p1, p2 ∧ p3), (p2, p1 ∧ 
p3), (p3, p1 ∧ p2), (p1 ∧ p2, p3), (p1 ∧ p3, p2), (p2 ∧ p3, p1)}; 
 
S**** = {m(p1, p2), m(p1, p3), m(p2, p1), m(p2, p3), m(p3, p1), m(p3, p2), m(p1, p2 ∧ 
p3), m(p2, p1 ∧ p3), m(p3, p1 ∧ p2), m(p1 ∧ p2, p3), m(p1 ∧ p3, p2), m(p2 ∧ 
p3, p1)}; 
 
CX(S) = mean(S****) = 
! !!,  !!   !  ! !!,  !!   !  ! !!,  !!!  ! !!,  !!   !  ! !!,  !!   !  ! !!,  !!  !  ! !!,  !!  ∧  !!   !  ! !!,  !!  ∧  !!   !  ! !!,  !!  ∧  !!!    ! !!  ∧  !!,  !!   !  ! !!  ∧  !!,  !!   !  ! !!  ∧  !!,  !!!" . 
 
So, when n = 2, CX(S) is the mean of 2 confirmation values, and when n = 3, CX(S) is the 
mean of 12 confirmation values. 
It can be shown that, where S = {p1, . . . , pn}, CX(S) is the mean of !! (2!!! − 1)!!!!!!  
confirmation values,23 or, equivalently, of 3n – 2n+1 + 1 confirmation values.24 So, when n = 4, 
                                                
22 See Eells and Fitelson (2002) for an overview of the main extant measures of 
confirmation, and for defense of the claim that certain symmetry considerations favor the 
“difference” measure and (a logarithm-based version of) the “likelihood” measure over their 
rivals. See also Crupi et al. (2007). 
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CX(S) is the mean of 50 confirmation values, when n = 5, CX(S) is the mean of 180 
confirmation values, when n = 6, CX(S) is the mean of 602 confirmation values, and so on. 
Instances of the schema thus all agree in the idea that the degree to which a set of claims 
is coherent is equal to the average degree to which the (claims, or iterated conjunctions 
thereof, in the) various non-empty and non-overlapping subsets of the set confirm each 
other.25 The best possible case is where the various subsets all maximally confirm each other. 
The worst possible case is where the various subsets all maximally disconfirm each other. 
Let’s turn now to (CDM), (CF), and (CR). I begin with (CDM). 
(CDM) involves the difference measure of confirmation: 
 
d(h, e) = Pr(h | e) − Pr(h).26 
 
Suppose S = {p1, p2}. Then, by (CDM) the degree to which S is coherent, “CDM(S),” is given 
by: 
 
CDM(S) = mean 𝑑 𝑝!, 𝑝! ,𝑑 𝑝!, 𝑝!  
 
= 
[!" !!   !!)  –  !"  (!!)]  !  [!" !!   !!)  –  !"  (!!)]! . 
 
CDM(S) can take values between -1 and 1 (not inclusive).27 (CDM) is naturally understood so 
that if CDM(S) < 0, S is incoherent, if CDM(S) = 0, S is neither coherent nor incoherent, and if 
CDM(S) > 0, S is coherent (though strictly speaking Douven and Meijs never explicitly say 
this; see Siebel 2005, 348-349). If some of the claims in S have a probability of 0, CDM(S) is 
undefined. 
Note that one can find (CDM) to be attractive even if one does not find the difference 
measure to be attractive qua measure of confirmation. Likewise with respect to the various 
                                                                                                                           
23 That CX(S) is the mean of !! (2!!! − 1)!!!!!!  confirmation values follows, 
ultimately, from the fact that S** has exactly !! (2!!! − 1)!!!!!!  members. See Douven and 
Meijs (2007, 412, n. 15). 
24 The result that CX(S) is the mean of 3n – 2n+1 + 1 confirmation values is due essentially 
to Kyle Kloster (to whom I am grateful). 
25 Douven and Meijs (2007, secs. 2-3) give a compelling defense of this idea. This 
defense, though, can be strengthened a bit. Douven and Meijs fail to prove “Conjecture 2.1” 
(2007, 408). The thesis in question—viz., that “one-any + partition coherence” does not entail 
“any-any coherence”—is true, as Douven and Meijs conjecture, and can be proven. 
26 Here “h” and “e” can be iterated conjunctions, e.g., p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3. d(h, e) is defined only 
if e has a positive probability. 
27 Why cannot CDM(S) = 1? CDM(S) = 1 only if each of the various confirmation values 
equals 1. But, none of the various confirmation values equals 1. This is because d(h, e) cannot 
equal 1. Suppose Pr(h) = 0. Then, assuming Pr(h | e) is defined, Pr(h | e) = 0, hence Pr(h | e) – 
Pr(h) = 0. Suppose, instead, Pr(h) > 0. Then, even if Pr(h | e) = 1, it follows that Pr(h | e) – 
Pr(h) < 1. Why cannot CDM(S) = -1? CDM(S) = -1 only if each of the various confirmation 
values equals -1. But, none of the various confirmation values equals -1. This is because d(h, 
e) cannot equal -1. Suppose Pr(h) = 1. Then, assuming Pr(h | e) is defined, Pr(h | e) = 1, hence 
Pr(h | e) – Pr(h) = 0. Suppose, instead, Pr(h) < 1. Then, even if Pr(h | e) = 0, it follows that 
Pr(h | e) – Pr(h) > -1. 
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alternative instances of the schema above and the measures of confirmation involved in 
them.28 The crucial question is whether the accounts are intuitive or plausible in what they 
imply or do not imply with respect to particular cases, and whether the accounts satisfy the 
various other desiderata for an adequate account of coherence. 
(CF) is just like (CDM) except that (CF) involves the following measure of confirmation: 
 
f(h, e) = 1 if e ⊨ h and e ⊭ ⊥; 
 = -1 if e ⊨ ~h; 
 = 
!" !     !)  !  !" !     ~!)!" !     !)  !  !" !     ~!) if e ⊭ h and e ⊭ ~h.29 
 
Suppose S = {p1, p2}, and p1 ⊭ p2, p1 ⊭ ~p2, p2 ⊭ p1, and p2 ⊭ ~p1. Then, by (CF) the degree to 
which S is coherent, “CF(S),” is given by: 
 
CF(S) = mean 𝑓 𝑝!, 𝑝! , 𝑓 𝑝!, 𝑝!  
 
= 
!" !!     !!)  –  !" !!     ~!!)!" !!     !!)  !  !" !!     ~!!)  !  !" !!     !!)  –  !" !!     ~!!)!" !!     !!)  !  !" !!     ~!!)! . 
 
CF(S) can take values between -1 and 1 (inclusive). If CF(S) < 0, S is incoherent. If CF(S) = 0, S 
is neither coherent nor incoherent. If CF(S) > 0, S is coherent. 
(CR) is just like (CDM) and (CF) except that the measure of confirmation involved in 
(CR) is the following: 
 
a(h, e) = 1 if e ⊨ h and e ⊭ ⊥; 
 = 0 if e ⊨ ~h; 
 = Pr(h | e) if e ⊭ h and e ⊭ ~h.30 
 
Let S = {p1, p2}, and suppose p1 ⊭ p2, p1 ⊭ ~p2, p2 ⊭ p1, and p2 ⊭ ~p1. Then, by (CR) the 
degree to which S is coherent, “CR(S),” is given by: 
 
CR(S) = mean 𝑎 𝑝!, 𝑝! , 𝑎 𝑝!, 𝑝!  = !" !!   !!)  !  !" !!   !!)! . 
 
CR(S) can take values between 0 and 1 (inclusive). (CR) is naturally understood so that the 
neutral point between incoherence and coherence is .5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
28 Douven and Meijs (2007, 411, n. 14) make a point to this effect. 
29 This measure of confirmation is a variant of John Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim’s 
measure (1952). 
30 This measure is best seen as a measure of absolute, as opposed to incremental, 
confirmation. Thus the “a” in “a(h, e).” 
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4 The accounts tested 
 
In 4.1, I discuss some problem cases for (CS), (CO), and (CDM) (but note that the case 
discussed in 4.1.1 is a problem case just for (CS) and (CDM)). In 4.2, I discuss some problem 
cases for (CF). In 4.3, I discuss some additional test cases. 
 
4.1 Some problem cases for (CS), (CO), and (CDM) 
 
4.1.1 Sets of contradictory claims 
 
Suppose a fair six-sided die was just rolled. Let S5 = {t, ~t}, where: 
 
t  = The die came up two. 
S5, it seems, is incoherent, indeed, is highly if not maximally incoherent. Likewise, it seems, 
with respect to any set of contradictory claims. 
(CS) and (CDM), though, cannot explain this (why any set of contradictory claims is 
highly if not maximally incoherent). There are sets of contradictory claims on which (CS) and 
(CDM) remain silent. Let S6 = {f, ~f}, where: 
 
f = 2 + 2 = 4. 
 
S6, like S5, is highly if not maximally incoherent. But consider: 
 
CS(S6) = 
!"  (!  ∧  ~!)!" !   ×  !"(~!); 
 
CDM(S6) = mean 𝑑 𝑓,~𝑓 ,𝑑 ~𝑓, 𝑓  
 
= 
[!" !     ~!)  –  !"  (!)]  !  [!" ~!     !)  –  !"  (~!)]! . 
 
Given that Pr(~f) = 0,31 it follows that Pr(f) × Pr(~f) = 0, hence CS(S6) is undefined,32 and it 
follows that Pr(f | ~f) is undefined, thus d(f, ~f) is undefined, thus CDM(S6) is undefined.33 
                                                
31 I am assuming, here and throughout the paper, that if a claim p is necessarily true, then, 
on any (admissible) probability function, Pr(p) = 1, and that if a claim p is necessarily false, 
then, on any (admissible) probability function, Pr(p) = 0. In assuming this I am glossing over 
some difficult issues in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. I 
leave it for further investigation how best to treat these issues and whether the best treatment 
would require substantive changes to the main points of this paper. For relevant discussion, 
see Chalmers (2011), Douven and Meijs (2007, sec. 5.1), Garber (1983), and Swinburne 
(1973, Ch. IV). 
32 This point can be established in two other ways. First, observe that: 
 
CS(S6) = 
!"(!  ∧  ~!)!" !   ×  !"(~!) = !" ~!   ×!" !     ~!)!" !   ×  !"(~!)  = !" !     ~!)!"(!) . 
 
Since the numerator in 
!" !     ~!)!"(!)  is undefined, CS(S6) is undefined. Second, observe that: 
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(CO), (CF), and (CR), by contrast, imply that S6 is maximally incoherent: 
 
CO(S6) = 
!" !  ∧  ~!!" !  ∨  ~!  = !! = 0; 
 
CF(S6) = mean({𝑓 𝑓,~𝑓 , 𝑓 ~𝑓, 𝑓 })  = !!  !  !!!  = -1; 
 
CR(S6) = mean({𝑎 𝑓,~𝑓 , 𝑎 ~𝑓, 𝑓 })   = !  !  !!  = 0. 
 
f(f, ~f) = -1 and a(f, ~f) = 0, since ~f ⊨ ~f. f(~f, f) = -1 and a(~f, f) = 0, given that f ⊨ ~~f. 
It is clear, of course, without any appeal to coherence considerations that one should not 
believe the claims in S6. The point remains, however, that S6 is incoherent and neither (CS) 
nor (CDM) can explain this. 
(CS) could be modified to say that if the members of a set S = {p1, p2} are contradictory 
claims, then S is maximally incoherent even if Pr(p1) × Pr(p2) = 0. Likewise, (CDM) could be 
modified to say that if the members of a set S = {p1, p2} are contradictory claims, then S is 
maximally incoherent even if d(p1, p2) or d(p2, p1) is undefined. But then (CS) and (CDM) 
would be unable to explain why sets of contradictory claims one member of which is a 
necessary falsehood are incoherent. 
 
4.1.2 Sets of necessary falsehoods 
 
Let S7 = {f, s}, where: 
 
f = 2 + 2 = 5; 
 
s = 2 + 2 = 6. 
 
S7, it seems, is incoherent, indeed, is highly if not maximally incoherent; f ⊨ ~s, and s ⊨ ~f. 
Likewise with respect to any set of necessary falsehoods. 
(CS), (CO), and (CDM), however, are silent on S7. Consider: 
                                                                                                                           
CS(S6) = 
!"(!  ∧  ~!)!" !   ×  !"(~!) = !" !   ×!" ~!     !)!" !   ×  !"(~!)  = !" ~!     !)!"(~!) . 
 
Since the denominator in 
!" ~!     !)!"(~!)  equals 0, CS(S6) is undefined. 
33 Douven and Meijs (2007, sec. 5.1) raise a problem for (CDM), and for certain other 
accounts of coherence, and give two proposals for solving the problem. Each proposal has the 
result that the only sets that should be considered when evaluating (CDM) are sets consisting 
of pairwise logically independent claims. This result entails that, since S6 is not a set 
consisting of pairwise logically independent claims, S6 should not be considered when 
evaluating (CDM). It seems clear, though, that S6 has a coherence value, in fact a very low if 
not maximally low coherence value. Moreover, it seems clear that many sets consisting of 
pairwise logically dependent claims have coherence values. So for the purposes of this paper I 
shall assume that the two proposals given by Douven and Meijs should be rejected and that 
the problem raised by Douven and Meijs for (CDM), and for the other accounts in question, 
can be adequately answered without appeal to those proposals. See Huemer (2011, 46-47) and 
Schubert (2012, 311-312). 
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CS(S7) = 
!"(!  ∧  !)!" !   ×  !"(!); 
 
CO(S7) = 
!" !  ∧  !!" !  ∨  ! ; 
 
CDM(S7) = mean 𝑑 𝑓, 𝑠 ,𝑑 𝑠, 𝑓  = [!" !     !)  –  !"  (!)]  !  [!" !     !)  –  !"  (!)]! . 
 
Clearly, CS(S7) and CO(S7) are undefined. CDM(S7) is undefined because, since both Pr(f | s) 
and Pr(s | f) are undefined, both d(f, s) and d(s, f) are undefined. The same is true of any 
alternative set of necessary falsehoods: (CS), (CO), and (CDM) remain silent. 
(CF) and (CR), by contrast, do well with S7: 
 
CF(S7) = mean({𝑓 𝑓, 𝑠 , 𝑓 𝑠, 𝑓 })  = !!  !  !!!  = -1; 
 
CR(S7) = mean({𝑎 𝑓, 𝑠 , 𝑎 𝑠, 𝑓 })  = !  !  !!  = 0. 
 
f(f, s) = -1 and a(f, s) = 0, since s ⊨ ~f. f(s, f) = -1 and a(s, f) = 0, given that f ⊨ ~s. Likewise 
for any alternative set of necessary falsehoods: (CF) and (CR) imply maximal incoherence. 
(CS), (CO), and (CDM) could be modified to say, respectively, that any set S = {p1, p2} 
consisting of necessary falsehoods is maximally incoherent even if Pr(p1) × Pr(p2) = 0, that 
any set S = {p1, p2} consisting of necessary falsehoods is maximally incoherent even if Pr(p1 ∨ 
p2) = 0,34 and that any set S = {p1, p2} consisting of necessary falsehoods is maximally 
incoherent even if d(p1, p2) and d(p2, p1) are undefined. But then (CS), (CO), and (CDM) 
would be unable to explain why sets of that sort are maximally incoherent. 
 
4.1.3 Sets involving a necessary falsehood 
 
Suppose S8 = {p1. . . , pn}, where {p1. . . , pn} is very large and highly coherent (on any 
account of coherence). Suppose (adapting a case from Foley 1979, 249) S9 = {p1, . . . , pn, 
pn+1}, where pn+1 is the necessary falsehood that 38 is greater than 6562.35 S9, it seems, has a 
lesser coherence value than S8, but, still, not the minimum coherence value. S9 has a greater 
coherence value than, say, the set {p, ~p}, where p is the claim that all ravens are black. S8 is 
highly coherent and, so, certain of the claims in S9—viz., p1, . . . , pn—hang together in the 
requisite sense. By contrast, none of the claims in the set {p, ~p} hang together in the requisite 
sense. 
S9 is problematic for (CO). Consider: 
 
CO(S9) = 
!" !!  ∧  …  ∧  !!  ∧  !!!!!" !!  ∨  …  ∨  !!  ∨  !!!! . 
 
                                                
34 A slight variant of this proposal with respect to (CO) is given in Glass (2005, 384, n. 7). 
35 38 = 6561. 
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Suppose Pr(p1 ∨ . . . ∨ pn ∨ pn+1) > 0. Then, since Pr(p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn ∧ pn+1) = 0, it follows that 
CO(S9) = 0. (CO) thus implies that, even though S8 is highly coherent and S9 differs from S8 
only in that pn+1 (a necessary falsehood) is a member of S9, S9 is maximally incoherent. 
S9 is also problematic for (CS) and (CDM). Consider: 
 
CS(S9) = 
!" !!  ∧  …  ∧  !!  ∧  !!!!!" !!)  ×  …  ×!" !!   ×  !"(!!!! ; 
 
CDM(S9) = mean({d(p1, p2), … d(p1, pn+1), …}). 
 
Since Pr(pn+1) = 0, it follows that Pr(p1) × . . . × Pr(pn) × Pr(pn+1) = 0, hence CS(S9) is 
undefined. It also follows that Pr(p1 | pn+1) is undefined, thus d(p1, pn+1) is undefined, thus 
CDM(S9) is undefined. So, (CS) and (CDM) are silent on S9.36 
(CF) and (CR), on the other hand, do well with S9. Suppose p2 ⊨ p1 and p2 ⊭ ⊥. Then it 
follows that: 
 
CF(S9) = mean({f(p1, p2), …}) = mean({1, …}) > -1; 
 
CR(S9) = mean({a(p1, p2), …}) = mean({1, …}) > 0. 
 
Note that CF(S) = -1 only when each of the various confirmation values (over which the mean 
is taken) equals -1, and that CR(S) = 0 only when each of the various confirmation values 
(over which the mean is taken) equals 0.37 
(CS) could be modified to say that if a claim in a set S = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} has a probability 
of 0, then, though Pr(p1) × Pr(p2) × . . . × Pr(pn) = 0, S is maximally incoherent. (CDM) could 
be modified in a similar fashion. But then, for one thing, though (CS) and (CDM) would not 
be silent on S9, (CS) and (CDM) would yield the wrong result with respect to S9. 
 
4.2 Some problem cases for (CF) 
 
(CF), like (CR), does well with sets of contradictory claims, sets of necessary falsehoods, and 
sets involving a necessary falsehood (at least in that (CF), like (CR), implies that sets 
involving a necessary falsehood can have a coherence value greater than the minimum). I turn 
now to some test cases with which, arguably, (CF), unlike (CR), does not do well. 
 
 
                                                
36 There are variants of the case where (CDM) is silent on the larger set but (CS) is not. 
Suppose S9* is just like S8 except that S9* includes two additional claims, pn+1 and pn+2, where 
each claim has a nonextreme probability and the one claim entails the falsity of the other 
claim. (CDM) is silent on S9*; Pr(pn+1 ∧ pn+2) = 0, thus Pr(p1 | pn+1 ∧ pn+2) is undefined, thus 
d(p1, pn+1 ∧ pn+2) is undefined, thus CDM(S9*) is undefined. (CS), by contrast, is not silent on 
S9*. CS(S9*) = 0 and so (CS) implies that S9* is maximally incoherent. This, it seems, is the 
wrong result. S9* has a lesser coherence value than S8. But, since (by hypothesis) certain of the 
claims in S9* (namely, p1, . . . , pn) hang together in the requisite sense, S9* is not maximally 
incoherent. 
37 In section 5, below, I consider the question of whether CR(S9) can have a coherence 
value greater than .5. 
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4.2.1 Pickpocket, Rabbit, and Rabbit* 
 
Mark Siebel argues that (CF) is inadequate in its implications with respect to (at least some) 
two-member sets of subcontrary claims (2004, 2005).38 Suppose a murder has been 
committed. There are 10 suspects. Each suspect has a probability of .1 of being the murderer, 
and each suspect has committed at least one crime: 2 suspects have committed robbery but not 
pickpocketing; 2 suspects have committed pickpocketing but not robbery; 6 suspects have 
committed robbery and pickpocketing. Let S10 = {r, p}, where: 
 
r = The murderer has committed robbery; 
 
p = The murderer has committed pickpocketing. 
 
Let’s call this case “Pickpocket.” Each suspect has committed robbery or pickpocketing, so r 
and p are subcontrary claims (given the background information). Siebel holds that S10 is 
coherent (given the high overlap between the set of robbers and the set of pickpocketers). 
(CF), though, implies that S10 is not coherent: 
 
CF(S10) = mean 𝑓 𝑟, 𝑝 , 𝑓 𝑝, 𝑟  = !" !     !)  –  !" !     ~!)!" !     !)  !  !" !     ~!)  !  !" !     !)  –  !" !     ~!)!" !     !)  !  !" !     ~!)!  
 
= 
.!"  –  !.!"  !  !  !   .!"  –  !.!"  !  !!  = -.143.39 
 
In fact, (CF) implies that no two-member set of subcontrary claims is coherent. 
(CR) implies that, as Siebel holds and contra (CF), S10 is coherent. Observe that: 
 
CR(S10) = mean({𝑎 𝑟, 𝑝 , 𝑎 𝑝, 𝑟 })    = !" !     !)  !  !" !     !)!  = .!"  !  .!"!  = .75. 
 
The table below compares the various accounts with respect to Pickpocket: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
38 Two claims are subcontraries just in case the falsity of the one claim entails the truth of 
the other. 
39 Here and below at several points I have rounded for convenience. The decision 
procedure PrSAT developed by Branden Fitelson (in collaboration with Jason Alexander and 
Ben Blum) provides an extremely efficient means of obtaining or verifying results such as 
those explained in this subsection (4.2) and the next (4.3). See Fitelson (2008) for a 
description of PrSAT and some applications. 
 Coherence and probability: A probabilistic account of coherence 16 
 Pickpocket 
CS(S10) .938 
CO(S10) .6 
CDM(S10) -.05 
CF(S10) -.143 
CR(S10) .75 
 
(CS) and (CDM) agree with (CF) that S10 is not coherent. (CO) agrees with Siebel and (CR) 
that S10 is coherent. 
It might seem that (CR) is incorrect in its implication that S10 is coherent. For, it might 
seem that, at least with respect to two-member sets of claims, coherence is a matter of positive 
probabilistic relevance and incoherence is a matter of negative probabilistic relevance. Pr(r | 
p) = .75 < Pr(r) = .8, and Pr(p | r) = .75 < Pr(p) = .8. So the claims in S10 are negatively 
probabilistically relevant to each other. It might seem, then, that S10 is incoherent, hence, 
contra (CR), is not coherent. 
Recall that (CS) implies that whether a two-member set of claims is coherent hinges on 
whether the claims in the set are positively probabilistically relevant to each other (in that if 
the claims are positively probabilistically relevant to each other then the set is coherent, if the 
claims are probabilistically irrelevant to each other then the set is neither coherent nor 
incoherent, and if the claims are negatively probabilistically relevant to each other then the set 
is incoherent). It is no surprise then that (CS) agrees with (CF) that S10 is not coherent. 
The idea that, at least with respect to two-member sets of claims, coherence is a matter of 
positive probabilistic relevance and incoherence is a matter of negative probabilistic relevance 
has some initial plausibility. But, it runs counter to another idea with some initial 
plausibility—the idea that, at least with respect to two-member sets of claims, maximal 
coherence is a matter of mutual entailment (where the one claim entails the other claim, and 
where each claim has a probability greater than 0) and maximal incoherence is a matter of 
incompatibility (where the one claim entails the negation of the other claim). Suppose S = {p1, 
p2}. Suppose p1 and p2 are mutually entailing. Suppose Pr(p1) = 1 = Pr(p2). Then, by the idea 
that maximal coherence is a matter of mutual entailment and maximal incoherence is a matter 
of incompatibility, it follows that S is maximally coherent. But, by the idea that coherence is a 
matter of positive probabilistic relevance and incoherence is a matter of negative probabilistic 
relevance, it follows that, since Pr(p1 | p2) = Pr(p1) = 1 and Pr(p2 | p1) = Pr(p2) = 1, S is neither 
coherent nor incoherent, hence is not maximally coherent.40 
I prefer the idea that, at least with respect to two-member sets of claims, maximal 
coherence is a matter of mutual entailment and maximal incoherence is a matter of 
                                                
40 Meijs (2006, 237) gives an argument along these lines. 
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incompatibility.41 One reason for this preference concerns sets of contradictory claims. Recall 
S6 = {f, ~f}, where f is the claim that 2 + 2 = 4. This set, as with any set of contradictory 
claims, is incoherent, in fact, arguably, is maximally incoherent. But, since Pr(f) = 1 and Pr(~f) 
= 0 and since, thus, it is not the case that f and ~f are negatively probabilistically relevant to 
each other (for one thing, Pr(~f | f) = 0 = Pr(~f)), it follows from the idea that coherence is a 
matter of positive probabilistic relevance and incoherence is a matter of negative probabilistic 
relevance that it is not the case that S6 is incoherent. By contrast, because f and ~f are 
incompatible with each other, it follows from the idea that maximal coherence is a matter of 
mutual entailment and maximal incoherence is a matter of incompatibility that S6 is 
incoherent, indeed, is maximally incoherent.42 
(CF) is initially attractive because, in part, it implies each of the following: 
 
(a) a set S = {p1, p2} is maximally coherent if p1 and p2 are logically equivalent 
and S is satisfiable; 
 
(b) a set S = {p1, p2} is maximally incoherent if each of {p1}, {p2}, and {p1, p2} 
is unsatisfiable; 
 
(c) a set S = {p1, p2} is coherent if S is “positively dependent,” where S is 
positively dependent just in case (a) f(p1, p2) > 0 and (b) f(p2, p1) > 0; 
 
(d) a set S = {p1, p2} is incoherent if S is “negatively dependent,” where S is 
negatively dependent just in case (a) f(p1, p2) < 0 and (b) f(p2, p1) < 0. 
 
(a) and (b) capture the idea that maximal coherence is a matter of logical equivalence and 
maximal incoherence is a matter of unsatisfiability. This idea is similar to the idea that 
                                                
41 In fact, I prefer the more general idea that for any set with two or more members 
maximal coherence is a matter of pairwise mutual entailment (where for each pair of claims in 
the set the one claim entails the other claim, and each claim has a probability greater than 0) 
and maximal incoherence is a matter of pairwise incompatibility (where for each pair of 
claims in the set the one claim entails the negation of the other claim). 
42 There are at least two further reasons for preferring the idea that maximal coherence is 
a matter of mutual entailment and maximal incoherence is a matter of incompatibility. First, if 
coherence is a matter of positive probabilistic relevance, it follows that no set of necessary 
truths is coherent. Hence no set of mathematical necessities is coherent, and no set of 
philosophical necessities is coherent (for example, no set of logical necessities is coherent), 
and so on. If, instead, maximal coherence is a matter of mutual entailment and maximal 
incoherence is a matter of incompatibility, it follows that all sets of necessary truths are 
coherent, indeed, maximally coherent. Second, if coherence is a matter of positive 
probabilistic relevance, it follows that there can be sets S and S* such that the claims in S are 
mutually entailing, the claims in S* are mutually entailing, and yet, because the prior 
probabilities of the claims in S are lower than the prior probabilities of the claims in S*, S has 
a greater coherence value than S*. If, instead, maximal coherence is a matter of mutual 
entailment and maximal incoherence is a matter of incompatibility, it follows that if the claims 
in S are mutually entailing and the claims in S* are mutually entailing, then, regardless of the 
prior probabilities of the claims in S and S*, S and S* have the same coherence value. For 
helpful discussion of (CF), (CS), (CO), and the issue of “prior-dependence,” see Glass (2005). 
See, also, Fitelson (2003, sec. 2) and Siebel and Wolff (2008). 
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maximal coherence is a matter of mutual entailment and maximal incoherence is a matter of 
incompatibility. (c) and (d), in turn, capture the idea that coherence is a matter of positive 
support (or confirmation) and incoherence is a matter of negative support. This idea is similar 
to the idea that coherence is a matter of positive probabilistic relevance and incoherence is a 
matter of negative probabilistic relevance. It turns out, though, that because (CF) implies each 
of (a)-(d) it yields some rather odd results. 
This point is due to Meijs (2006). So too are the two remaining cases in this subsection: 
“Rabbit” and “Rabbit*.” First, I shall set out the cases and show what (CF) implies with 
respect to them. Then I shall show what (CR) implies with respect to them. 
Suppose there is a small island somewhere in the Pacific Ocean with a population of 102 
rabbits: 100 of the rabbits are grey and have two ears; 1 of the rabbits is grey and has one ear; 
1 of the rabbits is albino and has two ears. Let this be Situation I. Suppose, instead, 100 of the 
rabbits are grey and have two ears, and 2 of the rabbits are albino and have one ear. Let this be 
Situation II. Let S11 = {g, e}, where: 
 
g = This rabbit is grey; 
 
e = This rabbit has two ears. 
 
This case is Rabbit. (CF) implies that in Situation I, where S11 is negatively dependent, S11 is 
incoherent: 
 
CF(S11) = mean 𝑓 𝑔, 𝑒 , 𝑓 𝑒,𝑔  = !" !     !)  –  !" !     ~!)!" !     !)  !  !" !     ~!)  !   !" !   !)  –  !" !     ~!)!" !     !)  !  !" !     ~!)!  
 
= 
!""/!"!  –  !!""/!"!  !  !  !  !""/!"!  –  !!""/!"!  !  !!  = -.005. 
 
Things are quite different with respect to Situation II. (CF) implies that in Situation II, where 
g and e are logically equivalent (given the background information) and S11 is satisfiable, S11 
is maximally coherent: 
 
CF(S11) = mean({𝑓 𝑔, 𝑒 , 𝑓 𝑒,𝑔 }) = !  !  !!  = 1. 
 
(CF) thus implies that S11 is incoherent in Situation I and is maximally coherent in Situation II, 
hence has a very much greater coherence value in Situation II. This is an odd result, given that 
the two situations differ hardly at all (in terms of rabbits and their properties). S11, it seems, is 
coherent in Situation I, and, what is crucial, has just a slightly greater coherence value in 
Situation II. 
This result, it turns out, does not depend on the number of two-eared grey rabbits. 
Suppose there are 10 million rabbits on the island, where all but 2 of the rabbits are grey and 
have two ears, 1 of the other 2 rabbits is albino and has two ears, and the 1 remaining rabbit is 
grey and has one ear. Let this be Situation I. Suppose instead all but 2 of the rabbits are grey 
and have two ears, and the other 2 rabbits are albino and have one ear. Let this be Situation II. 
This case is Rabbit*. In Situation I CF(S11) < 0: 
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CF(S11) = mean 𝑓 𝑔, 𝑒 , 𝑓 𝑒,𝑔  = !" !     !)  –  !" !     ~!)!" !     !)  !  !" !     ~!)  !   !" !   !)  –  !" !     ~!)!" !     !)  !  !" !     ~!)!  
 
= 
!!!!!!"/!!!!!!!  –  !!!!!!!"/!!!!!!!  !  !  !  !!!!!!"/!!!!!!!  –  !!!!!!!"/!!!!!!!  !  !!  = -.00000005. 
 
In Situation II CF(S11) = 1: 
 
CF(S11) = mean({𝑓 𝑔, 𝑒 , 𝑓 𝑒,𝑔 })  = !!  !!  = 1. 
 
So, (CF) yields the odd result that S11 is incoherent in Situation I, is maximally coherent in 
Situation II, and thus has a very much greater coherence value in Situation II. 
How does (CR) do with Rabbit and Rabbit*? In Rabbit in Situation I: 
 
CR(S11) = mean({𝑎 𝑔, 𝑒 , 𝑎 𝑒,𝑔 })  = !" !     !)  !  !" !     !)!  = !""!"!  !  !""!"!!  = .990. 
 
In Rabbit in Situation II: 
 
CR(S11) = mean({𝑎 𝑔, 𝑒 , 𝑎 𝑒,𝑔 }) = !!  !!  = 1. 
 
In Rabbit* in Situation I: 
 
CR(S11) = mean({𝑎 𝑔, 𝑒 , 𝑎 𝑒,𝑔 }) = !" !     !)  !  !" !     !)!  = !!!!!!"!!!!!!!  !  !!!!!!"!!!!!!!!  
 
= .9999999. 
 
In Rabbit* in Situation II: 
 
CR(S11) = mean({𝑎 𝑔, 𝑒 , 𝑎 𝑒,𝑔 }) = !!  !!  = 1. 
 
S11 is thus coherent, indeed, highly coherent, in Situation I in Rabbit, and is slightly more 
coherent in Situation II in Rabbit. The same is true with respect to Rabbit*. 
The table below compares the various accounts with respect to Rabbit and Rabbit*: 
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 Rabbit Rabbit* 
 Situation I Situation II Situation I Situation II 
CS(S11) .9999 1.02 .99999999999999 1.0000002 
CO(S11) .980 1 .9999998 1 
CDM(S11) -.0001 .020 -.00000000000001 .0000002 
CF(S11) -.005 1 -.00000005 1 
CR(S11) .990 1 .9999999 1 
 
(CS), (CO), and (CDM) agree with (CR) in implying that S11’s coherence value is just slightly 
greater in Situation II in Rabbit than in Situation I in Rabbit, and is just slightly greater in 
Situation II in Rabbit* than in Situation I in Rabbit*. (CO), but neither (CS) nor (CDM), 
further agrees with (CR) in implying that S11’s coherence value is high both in Situation I in 
Rabbit and in Situation I in Rabbit*. 
The claims in S10 are negatively probabilistically relevant to each other. Likewise, the 
claims in S11 both in Situation I in Rabbit and in Situation I in Rabbit* are negatively 
probabilistically relevant to each other. I turn now to a case, “Samurai Sword,” where the 
claims in the set at issue are positively probabilistically relevant to each other. I take the case 
from Douven and Meijs (2007, 414). 
 
4.3.2 Samuai Sword 
 
Suppose a murder has been committed on a street in a city with 10,000,000 inhabitants. 1050 
of the 10,000,000 inhabitants are Japanese and do not own a Samurai sword, 1050 of the 
10,000,000 inhabitants own a Samurai sword and are not Japanese, and just 9 of the 
10,000,000 inhabitants are Japanese and own a Samurai sword. The murderer lives in the city 
and each person in the city is equally likely to be the murderer. Let this be Situation I. 
Suppose, instead, the murderer lives on the street on which the body was found, 100 people 
live on that street, 1 of the 100 people is Japanese and does not own a Samurai sword, 1 of the 
100 people owns a Samurai sword and is not Japanese, and 9 of the 100 people are Japanese 
and own a Samurai sword. Let this be Situation II. Let S12 = {j, o}, where: 
 
j = The murderer is Japanese; 
 
o  = The murderer owns a Samurai sword. 
 
Intuitively, S12 has a greater coherence value in Situation II than in Situation I, indeed, has a 
much greater coherence value in Situation II than in Situation I. Furthermore, intuitively, S12 is 
very far from being maximally coherent in Situation I. 
(CF), though, implies that S12 has a just slightly greater coherence value in Situation II 
than in Situation I, and that S12 is nearly maximally coherent in Situation I. In Situation I: 
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CF(S12) = mean 𝑓 𝑗, 𝑜 , 𝑓 𝑜, 𝑗  = !" !     !)  –  !" !     ~!)!" !     !)  !  !" !     ~!)  !   !" !   !)  –  !" !     ~!)!" !     !)  !  !" !     ~!)!  
 
= 
!/!"#$  –  !"#"/!!!"!#$!/!"#$  !  !"#"/!!!"!#$  !  !/!"#$  –  !"#"/!!!"!#$!/!"#$  !  !"#"/!!!"!#$!  = .97559. 
 
In Situation II: 
 
CF(S12) = mean 𝑓 𝑗, 𝑜 , 𝑓 𝑜, 𝑗  = !" !     !)  –  !" !     ~!)!" !     !)  !  !" !     ~!)  !   !" !   !)  –  !" !     ~!)!" !     !)  !  !" !     ~!)!  
 
= 
!/!"  –  !/!"!/!"  !  !/!"  !  !/!"  –  !/!"!/!"  !  !/!"  !  = .97561. 
 
(CR) does well with Samurai Sword. In Situation I: 
 
CR(S12) = mean({𝑎 𝑗, 𝑜 , 𝑎 𝑜, 𝑗 }) = !" !     !)  !  !" !     !)!  = !/!"#$  !  !/!"#$!  
 
= .008. 
 
In Situation II: 
 
CR(S12) = mean({𝑓 𝑗, 𝑜 , 𝑓 𝑜, 𝑗 }) = !" !     !)  !  !" !     !)!  = !/!"  !  !/!"!  = .9. 
 
(CR) thus implies that S12 has a much greater coherence value in Situation II than in Situation 
I, and that S12 is very far from being maximally coherent in Situation I. 
The table below compares the various accounts with respect to Samurai Sword: 
 
 Samurai Sword 
 Situation I Situation II 
CS(S12) 80.251 9 
CO(S12) .004 .818 
CDM(S12) .008 .8 
CF(S12) .97559 .97561 
CR(S12) .008 .9 
 
(CO) and (CDM) agree with (CR) in implying that S12 has a much greater coherence value in 
Situation II than in Situation I, and that S12 is very far from being maximally coherent in 
Situation I. (CS), contra (CR) and each of the other accounts, implies that S12 has a lesser 
coherence value in Situation II than in Situation I. 
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4.3.3 Some additional test cases 
 
I now want to consider two additional test cases: “Tweety” and “Tweety*.” 
Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann (2003, 44-45, 50) argue that (CO) is counterintuitive. 
Let S13 = {b, g} and S14 = {b, g, p}, where: 
 
b  = Tweety is a bird; 
 
g = Tweety is a ground dweller; 
 
p = Tweety is a penguin. 
 
Suppose the probability distribution: 
 
b g p Pr  b g p Pr 
T T T .01  F T T 0 
T T F 0  F T F .49 
T F T 0  F F T 0 
T F F .49  F F F .01 
 
This case is Tweety. Intuitively, S14’s coherence value is greater than S13’s coherence value. 
(CO), however, implies that S14’s coherence value is equal to S13’s coherence value: 
 
CO(S13) = 
!" !  ∧  !!" !  ∨  !  = .!".!!; 
CO(S14) = 
!" !  ∧  !  ∧  !!" !  ∨  !  ∨  !  = .!".!!. 
 
Douven and Meijs (2007, 416-417) argue that things are even worse for (CO). Suppose a 
slightly different probability distribution (on which the probability that Tweety is a ground-
dwelling bird but not a penguin, for example, an ostrich, is greater than 0 but very small): 
 
b g p Pr  b g p Pr 
T T T .01  F T T 0 
T T F .000001  F T F .49 
T F T 0  F F T 0 
T F F .49  F F F .009999 
 
This case is Tweety*. Intuitively, S14’s coherence value is greater than S13’s coherence value. 
But, if (CO) is correct, it follows that S14’s coherence value is less than S13’s coherence value: 
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CO(S13) = 
!" !  ∧  !!" !  ∨  !  = .!"!!!".!!"""#; 
 
CO(S14) = 
!" !  ∧  !  ∧  !!" !  ∨  !  ∨  !  = .!".!!"""#. 
 
(CR) does well with Tweety and Tweety*. In Tweety, CR(S13) < CR(S14): 
 
CR(S13) = mean({𝑎 𝑏,𝑔 , 𝑎 𝑔, 𝑏 }) = !" !     !)  !  !" !     !)!  = .!"  !  .!"!  = .02; 
 
CR(S14) = mean({a(b, g) + a(b, p) + a(g, b) + a(g, p) + a(p, b) + a(p, g) + a(b, g ∧ 
p) + a(g, b ∧ p) + a(p, b ∧ g) + a(b ∧ g, p) + a(b ∧ p, g) + a(g ∧ p, b)}) 
 
= 
!" !  |  !   !  !  !  !" !  |  !   !  !!  !" !  |  !   !  !" !  |  !   !  !  !  !  !  !  !    !  !  !" !  ∧  !     !)  !  !" !  ∧  !  |  !!"  = 
.!"  !  !  !  .!"  !  !!  .!"  !  .!"  !  !  !  !  !  !  !    !  !  .!"  !  .!"!"   = .51. 
 
In Tweety*, CR(S13) < CR(S14): 
 
CR(S13) = mean({𝑎 𝑏,𝑔 , 𝑎 𝑔, 𝑏 }) = !" !     !)  !  !" !     !)!  = .!"!!!"  !  .!"!!!"!  
 
= .020002; 
 
CR(S14) = mean({a(b, g) + a(b, p) + a(g, b) + a(g, p) + a(p, b) + a(p, g) + a(b, g ∧ 
p) + a(g, b ∧ p) + a(p, b ∧ g) + a(b ∧ g, p) + a(b ∧ p, g) + a(g ∧ p, b)}) 
 
= 
!" !  |  !   !  !  !  !" !  |  !   !  !!  !" !  |  !   !  !" !  |  !   !  !  !  !  !  !" !  |  !  ∧  !   !    !  !  !" !  ∧  !     !)  !  !" !  ∧  !  |  !!"  = 
.!"!!!"  !  !  !  .!"!!!"  !  !!  .!"  !  .!"  !  !  !  !  !  .!!!!  !    !  !  .!"  !  .!"!"  = .509992. 
 
The table below compares the various accounts with respect to Tweety and Tweety*: 
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 Tweety Tweety* 
CS(S13) .04 .040004 
CS(S14) 4 3.99998 
CO(S13) 
. 01. 99 . 010001. 990001 
CO(S14) 
. 01. 99 . 01. 990001 
CDM(S14) -.48 -.479999 
CDM(S14) .255 .254991 
CF(S13) -.96 -.959996 
CF(S14) .4526126 .4526128 
CR(S13) .02 .020002 
CR(S14) .51 .509992 
 
(CS), (CDM), and (CF) all agree with (CR) that S14’s coherence value is greater than S13’s 
coherence value both in Tweety and in Tweety*. 
 
4.4 Summary 
 
In 4.1, I gave some problem cases for (CS), (CO), and (CDM), where each of the cases is 
unproblematic for (CR). In 4.2, I gave some problem cases for (CF), where each of the cases 
is unproblematic for (CR). In 4.3, I gave two additional test cases neither of which is 
problematic for (CR). It does not follow, of course, that (CR) is correct or even likely to be 
correct; more test cases need to be examined. But the results are at least suggestive.43 
 
 
5 (CR) and the Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs 
 
I began the paper with the question of whether coherence is necessary for (epistemic) 
justification, in that one’s beliefs are justified only if one’s belief system is coherent. Standard 
varieties of coherentism imply that the answer is affirmative. In this section I relate (CR) to an 
argument for rejecting this answer and, in turn, for rejecting standard varieties of coherentism. 
 
                                                
43 Certain of the accounts, even if inadequate as accounts of coherence, can be useful 
nonetheless, for example, in contexts of confirmation. See Dietrich and Moretti (2005), for 
discussion of (CF), (CO), and (CS) and the transmission of confirmation. 
 Coherence and probability: A probabilistic account of coherence 25 
5.1 Coherentism 
 
Coherentism is distinct from foundationalism, social contextualism, and infinitism in that, 
inter alia, coherentism requires (for justification) a “circular” chain of implication (or 
evidential support): 
 
Circular Chain of Implication (CCI): S’s belief in p is justified only if (i) S’s belief in p is 
implied (deductively or inductively) by certain of her other beliefs, which themselves are 
implied by certain of her other beliefs, and so on, and (ii) this chain of evidential support 
circles back around at some point and does not continue on ad infinitum with new belief 
after new belief. 
 
(CCI) should be understood so that (ii) does not require that the chain of implication in 
question literally take the shape of a circle, where, say, S’s belief in p is implied by her belief 
in q, which is implied by her belief in r, which is implied by her belief in p. It would be 
enough if, say, (a) S’s belief in p were implied by her belief in q together with her belief in r, 
(b) S’s belief in q were implied by her belief in p together with her belief in r, and (c) S’s 
belief in r were implied by her belief in p together with her belief in q.44 
Coherentism comes in many varieties. Here is a fairly simple variety: 
 
(C1) S’s belief in p is justified if and only if (i) S’s belief in p is implied by 
certain of her other beliefs, which themselves are implied by certain of her 
other beliefs, and so on, (ii) this chain of implication circles back around at 
some point and does not continue on ad infinitum, and (iii) S’s belief system 
is coherent. 
 
(C1) should be understood so that whether S’s belief system is coherent is determined by 
whether the set of claims believed by S is coherent, and so that S’s belief in p, if justified, is 
justified by (that is, is made justified by) not certain of her other beliefs, but by the fact that 
(i)-(iii) are satisfied.45 
The argument set out in the next subsection is spelled out in terms of (C1). But the 
argument can be generalized so that it applies to other varieties of coherentism. For example, 
the argument can be generalized so that it applies to varieties of coherentism on which what 
needs to be coherent is S’s system of beliefs and perceptual experiences.46 
 
                                                
44 For discussion of the “regress problem” and foundationalism, social contextualism, 
infinitism, and coherentism, and for references, see Cling (2008). It might be best to allow for 
varieties of coherentism on which some justification is noninferential, and thus on which it is 
not required for justification that (CCI) be satisfied. See Lycan (2012) and Poston (2012). 
45 A circular chain of implication should not be confused with a circular chain of 
justification. Coherentists (of the sort I have in mind) deny that justification is transferred 
between beliefs. Coherentists hold that justification is holistic: Beliefs are justified together 
when the requisite conditions are satisfied. For further discussion of this and related issues, 
see Roche (2012b). 
46 For discussion of varieties of coherentism of this sort, and for references, see Roche 
(2012b). 
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5.2 The Problem of Justified Inconsistent beliefs 
 
The Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs (see Foley 1979) can be put as follows. (C1) 
implies: 
 
(A) S’s belief in p is justified only if S’s belief system is coherent. 
 
It seems obvious that: 
 
(B) S’s belief system is coherent only if S’s belief system is consistent.47 
 
(A) and (B) together imply: 
 
(C) S’s belief in p is justified only if S’s belief system is consistent. 
 
(C) implies that if S’s belief system is inconsistent, then all of S’s beliefs are unjustified.48 But 
surely this implication is false. Consider, again, S8 = {p1, . . . , pn} and S9 = {p1, . . . , pn, pn+1}, 
where S8 is very large and highly coherent (on any account of coherence), and where pn+1 is 
the necessary falsehood that 38 is greater than 6562. Suppose Smith believes (all and only) the 
claims in S8. Smith is listening to his math professor, who, as it turns out, is quite tired. 
Smith’s math professor utters pn+1. Smith knows his math professor to be highly reliable on 
matters mathematical, and so comes to believe pn+1. Smith thus comes to believe the claims in 
S9. Let’s call this case “Tired Math Professor.” Smith’s belief system (when he believes the 
claims in S9) is inconsistent, hence by (C) it follows that all of Smith’s beliefs are unjustified. 
And yet, on certain ways of filling in the details, at least some of Smith’s beliefs, e.g., at least 
some of Smith’s perceptual beliefs, are justified. So, (C) is false. Therefore, given (B), it 
follows that (A) is false, hence (C1) is false. Or so the argument goes.49 
Coherentists, let’s suppose, should want to reject (C) and so should want to reject (A) or 
(B). The question is whether coherentists have a principled means of doing so. 
 
5.3 (CR) and inconsistency 
 
I showed above (4.1.3) that (CR) allows that S9 can have a coherence value greater than the 
minimum value of 0. Perhaps (CR) also allows that S9 can have a coherence value greater than 
.5. If so, coherentists can reject (B) on the grounds that (CR) is correct and (CR) implies that 
(B) is false. Further, coherentists can agree that at least some of Smith’s beliefs, e.g., at least 
some of his perceptual beliefs, are justified. Does (CR) allow that S9 can have a coherence 
value greater than .5? 
                                                
47 (B) should be understood so that whether S’s belief system is consistent is determined 
by whether the set of claims believed by S is consistent. 
48 (C), like (A), is fully general and so applies to all of S’s beliefs. 
49 There is a second version of the Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs pertaining to 
lottery-style cases. See Kvanvig (2012) for an explanation of the problem and an attempted 
solution. Eric Senseman (2010), a former undergraduate student of mine (at Texas Christian 
University), considers a variant of (CR) and how that variant relates to the problem. 
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The answer, unfortunately for proponents of views such as (C1), is negative. Suppose 
CR(S8) has the maximum value of 1, so each of the confirmation values in S8**** is equal to 1. 
Then, since (i) a(⋀S’, ⋀S’’) = 0 for any a(⋀S’, ⋀S’’) such that (a) a(⋀S’, ⋀S’’) is a member of 
S9**** and (b) ⋀S’ or ⋀S’’ involves pn+1,50 (ii) CR(S9) is the mean of 3n+1 – 2n+2 + 1 
confirmation values,51 (iii) each of the confirmation values in S9**** but not in S8**** is 
equal to 0, and (iv) there are 3n – 2n+1 + 1 remaining confirmation values in S9**** and each 
one is equal to 1, it follows that: 
 
CR(S9) =  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!  . 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!  approaches !! very quickly as n increases. Let n = 2, so S8 = {p1, p2} and S9 = 
{p1, p2, p3}. Then: 
 
CR(S9)  =  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!! = !!!!!!"!!"!! = !!" ≈ .167. 
 
This can also be seen by verifying that: 
 
CR(S9) = mean({a(p1, p2) + a(p1, p3) + a(p2, p1) + a(p2, p3) + a(p3, p1) + a(p3, p2) 
+ a(p1, p2 ∧ p3) + a(p2, p1 ∧ p3) + a(p3, p1 ∧ p2) + a(p1 ∧ p2, p3) + a(p1 ∧ 
p3, p2) + a(p2 ∧ p3, p1)}) 
 
= 
!  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !  !!"  = !!" ≈ .167. 
 
When n = 3, CR(S9) = 
!"!" = .24. When n = 4, CR(S9) = !"!"# ≈ .278. When n = 5, CR(S9) = !"#!"# ≈ 
.299. . . . When n = 10, CR(S9) = 
!"##$!"#$%& ≈ .329. But, regardless of the size of n (though given 
the constraint that 2 ≤ n < ∞ where n ∈   ℕ), !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!  < !! < .5.52 So, regardless of the size 
of n, it follows that CR(S9) < .5. Thus, since CR(S9) < .5 in the best case where CR(S8) = 1, it 
follows that CR(S9) < .5 in lesser cases where CR(S8) < 1. 
The lesson is that, though (CR) allows that S9 can have a coherence value greater than the 
minimum value of 0, (CR) does not allow that S9 can have a coherence value greater than .5. 
(CR), thus, does not provide coherentists with a principled means of answering the Problem of 
Justified Inconsistent Beliefs. 
                                                
50 If ⋀S’ involves pn+1, ⋀S’’ ⊨ ~⋀S’. If ⋀S’’ involves pn+1, ⋀S’’ ⊨ ~⋀S’. 
51 Recall (from 3.3) that where S = {p1, . . . , pn}, CX(S) is the mean of  3n – 2n+1 + 1 
confirmation values. Thus where S = {p1, . . . , pn, pn+1}, CX(S) is the mean of  3n+1 – 2n+2 + 1 
confirmation values. 
52 This follows from the fact that (i) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! < !! when n = 2, (ii) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! is a 
strictly increasing function of n (given the constraint that 2 ≤ n < ∞ where n ∈   ℕ), and (iii) lim!→! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! = !!. 
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I leave it for further inquiry whether one can accept a probabilistic account of coherence 
and yet avoid (C) by rejecting (B).53 I want to consider whether coherentists can accept (CR) 
and, still, avoid (C) by rejecting (A). I aim to show that the answer is affirmative. 
 
5.4 Nonglobal coherentism 
 
Proponents of (C1) are “globalist” coherentists, in that they require that S’s belief system as a 
whole be coherent. Coherentists per se, however, need not be globalists. Coherentists can be 
“nonglobalists” and hold that justification requires not that S’s belief system as a whole be 
coherent, but that a certain perhaps proper subset of S’s belief system be coherent.54 Consider 
the view: 
 
(C2) S’s belief in p is justified if and only if (i) S’s belief in p is implied by 
certain of her other beliefs, which themselves are implied by certain of her 
other beliefs, and so on, (ii) this chain of implication circles back around at 
some point and does not continue on ad infinitum, and (iii) the p-subset of 
S’s belief system is coherent. 
 
The “p-subset” of S’s belief system is the subset of his belief system relevant to the 
justification of his belief in p. If not all of S’s belief system is relevant to the justification of 
his belief in p, then the p-subset of S’s belief system is a proper subset of his belief system, 
and so (iii) in (C2) can be satisfied even if S’s belief system as a whole is not coherent. (C2) 
thus opens the way for coherentists to reject (C), along with (A), and allow for cases in which 
S’s belief system as a whole is inconsistent, and incoherent, and yet certain of S’s beliefs are 
justified.55 
Let’s return to Tired Math Professor. Suppose Smith’s belief in p1 is a perceptual belief. 
Suppose, as seems plausible, Smith’s belief in pn+1 is not a member of the p1-subset of Smith’s 
belief system. Suppose (CR) is correct, and by (CR) the p1-subset of Smith’s belief system is 
coherent. Suppose, finally, (i) and (ii) in (C2) are satisfied. Then, even though Smith’s belief 
system as a whole is inconsistent, (C2) implies that Smith’s belief in p1 is justified. 
A difficult question for proponents of a view such as (C2) is of which of S’s beliefs are in 
the p-subset of his belief system. Here I will not try to answer that question.56 The main point 
is just that, by accepting a view such as (C2), coherentists can accept (CR) and still allow that 
in cases such as Tired Math Professor certain of the subject’s beliefs are justified. 
 
                                                
53 One possibility would be to understand probability so that Pr(p) can be greater than 0 
even if p is a necessary falsehood (and so that Pr(p) can be less than 1 even if p is a necessary 
truth). For relevant discussion, see Chalmers (2011), Douven and Meijs (2007, sec. 5.1), 
Garber (1983), and Swinburne (1973, Ch. IV). See, also, Kvanvig (2012, sec. 2) and Lycan 
(1996, sec. VII; 2012, sec. 7). 
54 See Lycan (1996, 2012) and Olsson (1997). 
55 For discussion of an alternative way for coherentists to reject (C), even when (C) is 
construed not in terms of the notion of belief but in terms of the notion of acceptance, see 
Lehrer (1999). Cf. Olsson (1999). 
56 I take up the question elsewhere (2011). See, too, Kvanvig (2012, sec. 2). 
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6 Conclusion 
 
I have developed a probabilistic account of coherence, (CR), and argued that at least in certain 
respects it is preferable to Douven and Meijs’s account, (CDM), Fitelson’s account, (CF), 
Olsson’s account, (CO), and Shogenji’s account, (CS). Further, I have argued that (CR) does 
not provide coherentists with a principled means of answering the Problem of Justified 
Inconsistent Beliefs, and that nonetheless coherentists can accept (CR) and potentially answer 
the Problem of Justified Inconsistent Beliefs by rejecting globalist varieties of coherentism 
such as (C1) in favor of nonglobalist varieties such as (C2). 
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